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Abstract: It is now increasingly accepted that central banks and financial 
supervisors can no longer ignore climate change. However, there is no consensus 
on how they should address climate issues. On the one hand, there is a view that 
central banks and financial supervisors should mainly contribute to the assessment 
of the exposure of the financial system to climate-related financial risks, considering 
at the same time the possibility of incorporating climate risks into monetary policy 
and financial supervision and regulation. On the other hand, it is argued that central 
banks and financial supervisors need to take action such that they contribute directly 
to the decarbonisation of our economies and the prevention of climate systemic 
risks. In this paper, I analyse the main premises and implications of these two 
approaches and I explain why a systemic risk approach is necessary in the age of 
climate emergency. I also discuss the challenges involved in a policy agenda aiming 
at the reduction of climate systemic risks and I outline how these challenges can be 
tackled. 
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Recent years have seen a growing acceptance of the view that central banks can no 
longer ignore climate change (e.g. Carney, 2016; Scott et al., 2017; Honohan, 2019; 
Villeroy de Galhau, 2019; Arndt et al., 2020; Lagarde, 2020; Schnabel, 2021). There 
are two key arguments behind this view. First, climate change poses risks to the 
financial system (Campiglio et al., 2018; NGFS, 2019; Semieniuk et al., 2021). 
Gradual changes in atmospheric temperature and an increase in the severity and 
frequency of climate-related events (like hurricanes, wildfires and floods) can affect 
the ability of households and firms to repay debt, destabilising the banking system. 
They can also lead to a decline in the prices of bonds and stocks issued by 
companies that are impacted by these physical changes. On top of it, an abrupt 
transition to a low-carbon economy due to climate policies, improvements in low-
carbon technologies or changes in environmental preferences can affect adversely 
the financial position of carbon-intensive companies and their lenders. Given that 
central banks have a responsibility for safeguarding the stability of the financial 
system, it is now widely accepted that they should analyse these risks and take them 
explicitly into account in their operations.     
  
Second, it has been argued that climate change can affect the transmission 
channels of monetary policy and thus the ability of central banks to achieve their 
inflation targets (e.g. NGFS, 2020a; Dafermos et al., 2021b). For instance, physical 
and transition risks can affect asset prices, exchange rates, expectations and bank 
lending, which constitute significant channels by which changes in policy rates 
influence price developments. This makes clear that climate change can undermine 
the effectiveness of the inflation targeting framework, which is at the core of central 
banks’ operations nowadays.  
 
The establishment of the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), which 
was launched in December 2017, has played a key role in achieving a consensus in 
the central bank community about the need for central banks to address climate 
challenges. A growing number of academic studies and reports have also 
emphasised the need for central banks and financial supervisors to start taking 
climate change explicitly into account in their decision-making process (e.g. 
Campiglio et al., 2018; Bolton et al., 2020; Dafermos et al, 2020b; Schoenmaker, 
2021). More recently, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England 
decided to incorporate climate change considerations into their operations. In March 
2021, the Bank of England (BoE) announced that it would adjust the Corporate Bond 
Purchase Scheme (CBPS) to take into account the climate impact of bond issuers, 
as a response to the decision of the UK government to include the transition to a net 
zero emissions economy in the BoE mandate (Bank of England, 2021). In July 2021, 
the ECB announced a set of actions that it will take in the coming years to 




Purchase Programme (CSPP) and its financial supervisory tools (ECB, 2021a, 
2021b).1    
 
However, the fact that climate issues have started being introduced into monetary 
policy and financial supervision does not mean that there is a consensus on how 
central banks and financial supervisors should address climate change. The key 
question is this: should central banks and financial supervisors focus on the 
exposure of the financial system to climate risks, or should they play a more 
proactive role by promoting the transition to a low-carbon economy and contributing 
thereby to the reduction of climate-related systemic risks? Those who support the 
view that the exposure to risks should be the main focus of central banks and 
financial supervisors use as a key argument that the responsibility for the low-carbon 
transition rests with elected governments. Thus, what central banks and financial 
supervisors need to do, according to this view, is to contribute to the quantification of 
climate-related risks (which are not currently priced by financial actors) and to take 
actions that will induce financial institutions and central banks themselves to reduce 
their exposure to these risks. I call this the ‘risk exposure’ approach.  
 
On the contrary, there is a view that central banks and financial supervisors are not 
in a position to quantify climate-related risks properly due to the existence of 
fundamental uncertainty and the complexities linked with system-wide interactions. 
This view also emphasises that central banks are not neutral in the fight against 
climate change: their policies shape markets and have an impact on emissions. 
Hence, their role, it is argued, should not be confined to the passive analysis of 
climate risks, but it should be expanded to include actions that contribute directly to 
the transition to a low-carbon economy, in line with the Paris Agreement. This 
approach recognises that governments need to play the primary role for 
decarbonisation, but it emphasises, at the same time, the systemic role that central 
banks play in the modern financial system and their ability to contribute to the 
acceleration of the low-carbon transition. Since this view analyses the role of central 
banks from a systems-based perspective and points out the need for the prevention 
of climate-related systemic risk, I call it the ‘systemic risk’ approach.   
 
The systemic risk approach is very close to what Chenet et al. (2021) call the 
‘precautionary’ approach to monetary and financial policy, based on the 
‘precautionary principle’ which posits that, in the face of uncertainty, preventative 
policies are necessary to protect the human health and the environment. I use the 
term ‘systemic risk’ (i) to emphasise the different way by which this approach 
conceptualises risk management compared to the ‘risk exposure’ approach and (ii) 
to point out the systems-based foundations of this approach, which draw on post-
Keynesian and ecological economics.    
 
 





Looking at the recent climate-related announcements of the ECB and the BoE, it can 
be argued that the ECB climate action plan is closer to the ‘risk exposure’ approach 
since it concentrates primarily on how the euro area central banks and the private 
financial institutions will reduce their exposure to climate risks. On the contrary, the 
intention of the BoE to consider the climate impact of bond issuers in the CBPS is 
more in line with the direct promotion of the low-carbon transition and thus with the 
‘systemic risk’ approach.  
 
However, broadly speaking, the analyses and policy interventions in the area of 
central banking, financial supervision and climate change do not necessarily adopt 
strictly the one or the other approach. For instance, some studies might recognise 
the system-wide nature of climate risks, but do not necessarily support the idea that 
central banks should actively contribute to decarbonisation; some analyses might 
support the policy implications of both approaches; and some policy interventions 
(like the intention of the ECB to incorporate climate criteria into CSPP) might have a 
risk exposure focus, but consider at the same time how they can contribute to 
climate neutrality. However, distinguishing between the two approaches allows us to 
shed a systematic light into the contemporary debates around central banking and 
climate change, and illuminate how different theoretical perspectives can lead to 
policy interventions that can have very different implications.   
 
The aim of this paper is to compare and contrast these two different views and 
explain why the systemic risk approach is arguably more appropriate in the era of 
climate emergency. In Sections 2 and 3, I analyse the theoretical foundations and 
the policy implications of each of these approaches. In Section 4, I explain the 
advantages of the systemic risk approach over the risk exposure one. I also discuss 
the challenges involved in a policy agenda aiming at the reduction of climate 
systemic risks and I outline how these challenges could be tackled. Section 5 
summarises and concludes.    
 
2. The risk exposure approach 
 
The risk exposure approach relies on two key propositions. I explain them in turn.   
 
Proposition 1: Financial markets and central banks have not so far assessed 
adequately their exposure to climate-related financial risks.  
 
The starting point of the climate exposure approach is the fact that financial markets 
have only to a very small extent assessed the risks related to climate change (see 
Carney, 2015; NGFS, 2018; Weidmann, 2019). The result is that the exposure of 
financial institutions to climate risks is underestimated. This is perceived to be the 




methodologies and data. Moreover, it is pointed out that central banks, which 
typically rely on financial markets for the evaluation of risk, have also underestimated 
the climate risks related with the conduct of monetary policy (see Monnin, 2020). 
This includes, for example, the climate risk of bonds purchased as part of 
quantitative easing programs or are included in central bank collateral frameworks.   
 
Proposition 2: Climate risks are exogenous to the actions of central banks and 
financial supervisors.  
 
In analyses about the exposure of financial markets and central banks to climate 
risks, it is typically assumed that the physical and transition risks are determined 
primarily by the actions of governments. In line with environmental economics, 
climate change is conceptualised as a ‘market failure’, which is the result of the fact 
that households and firms do not pay for the damage that they cause when they 
generate emissions. It is then argued that this issue, which is the source of physical 
risks, could be simply addressed by imposing a carbon tax (or other forms of carbon 
pricing), as part of governments’ climate responsibilities (e.g. Olovsson, 2018).2   
 
Although in some cases it is recognised that the lack of carbon pricing is not the sole 
cause of climate change, it is implicitly argued that the actions of central banks do 
not have an impact on climate-related financial risks. This is perceived to be so 
either because the interventions of central banks are – and should be – designed in 
a way that makes their impact neutral (based on the market neutrality principle) or 
because their effect on climate risks is negligible. The same is considered to be the 
case for financial supervisors: their actions are not perceived to have a significant 
impact on climate risks.  
 
The above two propositions have the following policy implications.  
 
Policy implication 1: Central banks should help private financial institutions to 
adequately evaluate their exposure to climate-related financial risks.  
 
Given that financial markets have not managed so far to price climate risks, central 
banks and financial supervisors have a significant role to play in addressing this 
market failure. They can do so by promoting the development of methodologies that 
help financial institutions to assess these risks and by encouraging climate-related 
financial disclosures (see ECB, 2020; NGFS, 2020b). An initiative that has attempted 
to contribute to this direction is the establishment of the Task Force on Climate-
related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) by the Financial Stability Board (FSB). One of 
the main aims of TCFD, which was launched in 2015, is to develop climate risk 
disclosure approaches that will provide information to investors, lenders, insurers 
 
2 However, an abrupt implementation of a carbon tax policy can cause transition risks; this is taken 
into account in climate scenarios that have been developed for the finance community (see e.g. Allen 




and other stakeholders about the climate risks linked with their investments (TCFD, 
2019).  
 
An additional significant role that central banks can play in the evaluation of climate 
risks is to incorporate climate risks into their stress testing exercises. Such 
preliminary exercises have already been conducted (see, for example, Battiston et 
al., 2017; 2o Investing Initiative, 2019; Vermeulen et al., 2019; Allen et al., 2020; 
Baudino and Svoronos, 2021). The purpose of climate stress tests is to examine the 
vulnerability of the financial system to climate-related financial shocks linked with 
physical or transition risks (see NGFS, 2020b).     
 
Policy implication 2: Climate risks should be reflected in monetary policy 
operations as well as in financial regulation and supervision.   
 
The risk exposure approach asserts that it is not just the private financial institutions 
that should incorporate climate risks in their decision-making process. It also asserts 
that central banks and financial supervisors need to ensure that these risks are 
reflected in monetary policies and financial supervision and regulation (see, for 
example, Cœuré, 2018; Villeroy de Galhau, 2019). Table 1 shows some examples of 
how this could happen in practice.  
 
Table 1: Examples of climate monetary and financial policy tools: risk exposure vs 
systemic risk approach 
     
 
Source: Own depiction  
 
To begin with, the risk exposure approach suggests that central banks should 
consider the climate risk profile of different assets when they make decisions about 
which assets they should purchase under their unconventional monetary policy 
programmes, or which assets should be included in the list of securities accepted as 
collateral by central banks when they provide liquidity to commercial banks. 
Currently, credit quality is one of the criteria used in these decisions. However, the 
existing credit ratings ignore climate risks. Hence, central banks might currently buy 
assets with low credit quality from a climate point of view, reinforcing the market 
Risk exposure approach Systemic risk approach
Central bank purchases Exclusion of assets that exchibit high 
climate risks
Exclusion of carbon-intensive assets and 
inclusion of climate-friendly assets
Collateral framework Adjustment of haircuts based on 
climate risks 
Adjustment of haircuts and 
inclusion/exclusion of assets based on 
greenness/dirtiness
Financial regulation Higher capital requirements for assets 
that exhibit high climate risks
Higher capital requirements for carbon-
intensive assets (potentially lower  




failure that the risk exposure approach intends to address. To deal with this, the risk 
exposure approach suggests that central banks should adjust their risk assessment, 
which might lead them to exclude from their purchases those assets that exhibit high 
climate risk or by increasing the haircuts of climate risky assets included in the 
collateral frameworks.   
 
Financial regulation is another example of a policy instrument that can be adjusted 
according to the risk exposure approach. The rationale is straightforward: higher 
capital requirements should be imposed on assets that exhibit higher climate risks. 
This is in line with the traditional micro-prudential approach to regulation that posits 
that regulatory requirements should reflect the exposure of individual financial 
institutions to risks.   
 
The risk exposure approach contends that the climate-related actions of central 
banks and financial supervisors/regulators should not expand beyond the mere 
reflection of climate risks in their operations and frameworks. The climate problem 
should be solved almost exclusively by carbon pricing and central banks should not 
be involved in the decarbonisation process (e.g. Olovsson, 2018). It is argued that 
the latter should be left to politicians. As Carney (2020, p. 3) puts it ‘…absent explicit 
direction in its remit, the Bank would not advantage green lending in its risk-based 
supervision. Its approach would match the inherent riskiness of the assets. To do 
otherwise would be to mix climate policy with prudential policy.’ Similarly, Weidmann 
(2019) highlights that ‘…it would be wrong to want to use banking regulations to set 
climate policy incentives, for example by granting risk weighting “discounts” for 
“green” assets. Capital requirements should always be geared to risk. Creating 
incentives to protect the climate, on the other hand, is a matter for politicians.’ 
 
Before we proceed to describe the systemic risk approach, it is worth highlighting 
that the risk exposure approach has so far focused primarily on transition risks.  
Given that the transition risks are to a great extent expected to be higher for carbon-
intensive companies, it is often argued that the quantification of climate transition 
risks and their incorporation into monetary policy and financial regulation can be 
conducive to high investment in low-carbon technologies (e.g. Monnin, 2018). 
Although this might be the case, it needs to be highlighted that this is simply a side 
effect of the risk exposure approach: decarbonisation is not explicitly targeted by this 
approach (see Weidmann, 2019; Caldecott, 2020).  
 
3. The systemic risk approach 
The systemic risk approach relies on the following two propositions.  
 
Proposition 1: Climate-related financial risks depend on the complex interactions 




the political system. Due to fundamental uncertainty, these risks can never be 
adequately quantified.   
 
The systemic risk approach views climate change as a result of the complex 
interactions between the ecosystem, the macroeconomy and the financial system, 
giving at the same time particular attention to the role played by the distribution of 
power and societal dynamics. This is in line with the tradition of post-Keynesian and 
ecological economics.3 In this context, the continuous rise in greenhouse gas 
emissions over the last century or so has multiple causes related, for instance, to the 
lack of adequate environmental regulation, insufficient green public investment, 
carbon-intensive consumption norms and a powerful financial sector that does not 
have an interest in divesting from fossil fuels.  
 
According to the systemic risk approach, decarbonisation cannot thus be achieved 
by relying only on carbon pricing. Instead, the transition to a low-carbon economy 
requires a combination of fiscal, industrial, financial and regulatory policies. All these 
policies can affect the path of carbon emissions in the next decades. Physical risks 
depend to a great extent on how these policies will be materialised. The same holds 
for the analysis of transition risks which depend on a multidimensional and quickly 
evolving policy landscape.  
 
At the core of this approach is, therefore, the view that the accurate measurement of 
climate-related financial risks is an impossible task due to the existence of 
fundamental uncertainty (see also Chenet et al., 2021). There are two types of 
fundamental uncertainty: epistemological uncertainty and ontological uncertainty 
(see Dosi and Egidi, 1991; Davidson, 1996; Lavoie, 2014).  
 
Epistemological uncertainty captures both (i) the uncertainty caused by the lack of all 
the information that is necessary to measure properly climate effects and (ii) the 
inability of people to process properly the available information. For instance, we 
currently have incomplete or no information about the emissions of many companies 
around the world. This incomplete information prevents an accurate understanding of 
how different companies might be affected under different climate transition 
scenarios. But even if such or other types of information were available, we would 
not still be able to process this information fully, given the limitations of our 
conceptual frameworks and modelling tools.  
 
Ontological uncertainty is associated with the fact the future is transmutable: the 
decisions taken by individuals and institutions currently about climate change might 
lead to changes in climate risks that could not be foreseen even by those causing 
these changes. For example, if some global systemically important banks decide at 
 
3 For the links between post-Keynesian and ecological economics, see Kronenberg (2010), Dafermos 




the same time to stop lending to fossil fuel companies because of concerns about 
climate transition risks, the fact that these fossil fuel companies will lose access to 
credit from these banks might deteriorate their financial position, exacerbating 
climate transition risks. Hence, when banks make decisions based on assessments 
about transition risks, they cannot anticipate how these risk assessments by 
themselves and other banks will affect the risks that these banks try to quantify.     
 
The existence of fundamental uncertainty does not imply that there should not be 
attempts to analyse and model climate risks and their implications. But it should be 
acknowledged that these risks can never be properly quantified and climate scenario 
exercises should be considered illustrative and explanatory and should not be the 
sole guide for policy making (see Bolton et al., 2020).  
 
Proposition 2: Climate risks are not exogenous to the actions of central banks and 
financial supervisors. 
 
From a systemic risk perspective, what central banks and financial supervisors do 
has implications for climate risks. Although their impact on these risks is less 
significant compared to government policies, the actions and decisions of central 
banks have non-neutral climate-related economic effects. For example, when central 
banks purchase bonds issued by fossil fuel companies or when they include such 
bonds in the list of marketable assets that they accept as collateral, they support 
carbon-intensive production, with adverse effects on physical risks. One of the 
reasons for this is that – as recent empirical evidence has shown – those bonds that 
are included in collateral framework and central bank asset purchases exhibit lower 
yields and the companies that issue these bonds seem to increase bond issuance, 
employment and investment (e.g. Giambona et al., 2020; Luck and Zimmerman, 
2020; Nguyen, 2020; Pelizzon et al., 2020; Todorov, 2020).  
 
Another example is linked with climate stress testing. When central banks and 
financial supervisors conduct climate stress tests to measure how much banks are 
exposed to climate risks, the process of conducting the stress tests and the 
announcement of the results of these tests might change the behaviour of financial 
actors against banks, exposing the latter even more to climate risks. At the same 
time, in the face of climate stress tests, banks might adjust their lending behaviour. 
For instance, they might decide to lend less to companies that are carbon-intensive 
or their operations are located in climate vulnerable regions. Such a change in 
lending behaviour could exacerbate climate risks.  
 
The systemic risk approach also emphasises the central role that central banks play 
in shaping financial markets and providing signals. Take, for example, the asset-
backed securities (ABSs) market. The fact that the ECB relaxed the collateral 
eligibility criteria for ABSs in 2008-9 was a significant intervention that put a floor 




Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP) in 2014 stabilised a market 
that faced significant pressures after the outbreak of the crisis, giving at the same 
time a boost to securitisation (see Braun, 2018).  
 
In addition, the way the ECB designed its collateral framework in the 2000s provided 
significant signals to the private repo markets (Gabor, 2016). Or, when Mario Draghi 
made his ‘whatever it takes’ speech in 2012, the signal that he gave to the financial 
markets about the interventions that the ECB was willing to make to ensure the 
stability in the euro area was sufficient to bring about a sustained reduction in 
sovereign bond spreads. This implies that the way that central banks will announce 
how they will use their tools to address physical and transition risks will by itself have 
an impact on the expectations of financial players, which will very likely have a non-
neutral effect on how these risks will manifest.   
 
It is important to note that the proposition that climate risks are not exogenous to the 
actions of central banks is in line with the concept of ‘double materiality’ (see 
European Commission, 2019; Täger, 2021). This concept suggests that institutions 
should not only analyse the impact of climate change on their operations, but also 
the effects of their activities on climate change. Although this concept has been 
primarily discussed in the context of private companies, it can well be extended to 
the analysis of the climate effects of central banks (Dafermos et al., 2021b; Oman 
and Svartzman, 2021).   
 
Let me now explain which are the key policy implications of the two propositions 
described above.  
 
Policy implication 1: Central banks and financial supervisors should take action 
that is conducive to decarbonisation and the reduction of physical risks.   
 
Given that (i) central banks can affect the financing conditions for green and carbon-
intensive activities and shape how financial markets treat such activities, and (ii) 
physical risks are central for the long-run stability of the financial system, the 
systemic risk approach advocates that central banks should take action that reduces 
emissions (see also Chenet et al., 2021). Although their contribution to 
decarbonisation might be less significant in comparison with government 
interventions, they have a responsibility to take climate proactive action that is 
conducive to the long-run stability of the financial system.  
 
Table 1 shows examples of what a proactive approach would mean in practice for 
monetary policy and financial regulation (see also Campiglio, 2016; Volz, 2017; 
Monnin, 2018; D’Orazio and Popoyan, 2019; Tooze, 2019; van Lerven et al., 2020). 
In the case of quantitative easing, central banks could purchase less bonds issued 
by companies that are carbon-intensive and buy instead more bonds that are issued 




to decarbonisation. Dafermos et al. (2020a, 2020b) have, for example, shown how 
the corporate quantitative easing programmes of the BoE and the ECB could be 
modified by excluding carbon-intensive companies and adding bonds linked with a 
lower climate footprint. In addition, Schoenmaker (2021) has illustrated how central 
bank asset purchases can be adjusted based on the carbon intensity of bond 
issuers.  
 
In the case of collateral frameworks, central banks can adjust both the securities that 
they include in the list of assets that are accepted as collateral for the provision of 
central bank liquidity and the haircuts of these securities. Haircuts could be adjusted 
based on the carbon intensity of the issuers of securities (Schoenmaker, 2021); at 
the same time, securities issued by highly carbon-intensive companies could be 
excluded from the collateral framework, while securities linked with companies that 
undertake climate mitigation activities could be included in the list of assets accepted 
as collateral (Dafermos et al., 2021a).       
 
Financial regulation could also become climate-aligned and contribute to 
decarbonisation. One way for doing so would be through the introduction of a ‘dirty 
penalising factor’ whereby banks are required to hold higher capital for loans 
provided to support carbon-intensive companies or activities. Simultaneously, banks 
could be required to hold less capital against loans provided to green activities 
(‘green supporting factor’). From a systemic risk perspective, both tools need to be 
considered since they can contribute to decarbonisation. However, particular 
attention should be paid to the financial stability implications of the green supporting 
factor since it can increase the leverage of banks.4   
 
Interestingly, the policy interventions that stem from the systemic risk approach 
might look far from practices that have been typically used by central banks in high-
income countries over the last decades. However, they are less far from tools that 
central banks in low-income and middle-income countries have already used to 
promote environmental sustainability. For example, the Bank of Bangladesh requires 
that financial institutions allocate at least 5% of their total loan portfolio to green 
sectors; the People’s Bank of China has introduced a facility that provides low-cost 
liquidity for banks that provide green loans and has included green performance 
measurements in the macro prudential assessment of commercial banks; the 
Reserve Bank of India has included renewable energy companies in its Priority 
Sector Loans scheme (Dikau and Ryan-Collins, 2017; Volz, 2017; Campiglio et al., 
2018; D’Orazio and Popoyan, 2019; Kedward et al., 2020; Baer et al., 2021). 
 
 
4 For a detailed discussion of the features and the potential implications of the green supporting and 
the dirty penalising factor see D’Orazio and Popoyan (2019), Thomä and Gibhardt (2019), Berenguer 
et al. (2020), Dafermos and Nikolaidi (2021) and Dunz et al. (2021). See also Finance Watch (2020) 
for a financial regulation proposal that would make banks’ new fossil fuel exposures entirely equity-




According to the systemic risk approach, central banks need also to consider how 
they can support the financing of climate adaptation activities (like investments in 
flood protection and agricultural systems), whose role is becoming increasingly 
important given the current global warming trends. Since climate adaptation can 
reduce the materialisation of physical risks, the support of adaptation can be 
conducive to financial stability.    
 
Policy implication 2: Climate-aligned monetary and financial policies should be 
coordinated with other climate policies such that their contribution to climate risk is 
maximised. Coordination is also required among central banks.    
 
From a systems-based perspective, the isolated implementation of climate-aligned 
central bank tools will be far from being enough to safeguard financial stability in the 
long run. Fiscal, industrial and environmental regulation policies have an important 
role to play and policy coordination is necessary. This coordination is essential not 
only because it can lead to more substantial reductions in emissions, but also 
because it can minimise some transition effects that climate-aligned regulation and 
central banking tools might have.   
 
For example, Dafermos and Nikolaidi (2021) have shown that the introduction of a 
dirty penalising factor can lead to an increase in default rates since a significant part 
of the firm sector is carbon-intensive and can experience a decline in credit 
availability and, hence, a deterioration in its liquidity position. However, this increase 
can be lower if the dirty penalising factor is accompanied by a carbon tax and a 
green subsidy policy mix. This is so since green fiscal policy can increase green 
investment and reduce thereby the amount of loans that would be subject to higher 
capital requirements, as a result of the introduction of a dirty penalising factor.  
 
Moreover, given that physical climate-related risks depend on global emissions, 
isolated country-specific central bank and financial supervision interventions are 
unlikely to have an important effect on physical risks. For instance, even if some 
central banks try to reduce emissions in their countries, the impact on physical risks 
would be small without coordinated measures at the global level. Central bank 
coordination is thus essential from a systems-based perspective. 
 
4. Why we need a systemic risk approach 
 
There are at least three reasons why the systemic risk approach is preferable to the 
risk exposure one. First, the risk exposure approach over-simplifies the processes 
that determine climate-related financial risks. According to this approach, the fact 
that financial institutions have not incorporated climate risks into their operations is 
considered to be primarily the result of the lack of transparency, information and 




be accurately captured. It is not thereby recognised that in a world of fundamental 
uncertainty the transition and physical risks rely on system-wide implications and are 
not independent of how private financial institutions and central banks behave. In 
that sense, the risk exposure approach repeats the mistakes that financial regulators 
made in the period prior to the global financial crisis. One such mistake was that the 
Basel II micro-oriented prudential measures incentivised banks to take more risks 
during periods of high perceived stability, leading ultimately to higher systemic risk. 
  
Post-crisis, Basel III introduced measures that try to address this problem. One such 
measure is the counter-cyclical capital buffer: under Basel III, banks might face 
higher capital requirements during periods of excess aggregate credit growth and 
lower capital requirements during periods of low credit growth (BIS, 2010). By 
recognising the impact that capital requirements can have on the lending behaviour 
on banks, one of the aims of the countercyclical capital buffer is to reduce system-
wide risk by contributing to the reduction of credit availability during upturns and 
increase credit availability during downturns.     
 
Therefore, what Basel III does through the countercyclical capital buffer is that it 
identifies a source of systemic risk (the source of risk is the excess credit expansion 
in the upturn and the weak credit expansion in the downturn) and adjusts capital 
requirements such that this risk is reduced. In similar lines, the systemic risk 
approach identifies greenhouse gas emissions as a source of systemic risk and 
suggests that monetary and financial policies can be used to reduce these 
emissions. On the contrary, the risk exposure approach does not target explicitly this 
source of systemic risk. Its main aim is to protect individual institutions from climate 
risks and improve the micro-based credit standards of central banks; it does not 
intend to change financial behaviour such that the systemic risk is reduced.  
 
Second, the risk exposure approach is likely to act as a barrier to decarbonisation. 
Central banks seem currently willing to incorporate climate risks into their tools under 
the condition that these risks will be properly measured. Although there has recently 
been a lot of progress on this, we are still far from the development and application 
of widely accepted methodologies for the measurements of these risks. This means 
that the development of climate-aligned tools might delay significantly if most central 
banks rely primarily on the risk exposure approach. Moreover, it is not clear if the 
application of such methodologies will ultimately be beneficial for the promotion of 
low-carbon activities. For instance, it is not clear that dirty assets are riskier than 
green assets: the evidence is still inconclusive on this issue (see e.g. NGFS, 2020c) 
and the perceived riskiness depends on what climate scenarios are used for 
analysing risks.5 Therefore, even if central banks and financial supervisors decide to 
 
5 If financial portfolios are evaluated based primarily on scenarios that assume a slow or an 
optimistically smooth transition to a low-carbon economy, it might be concluded that these portfolios 




incorporate climate risks into their policies and frameworks, it might still be the case 
that the financing of low-carbon investment will not be enhanced. 
 
Third, the risk exposure approach can undermine climate adaptation. While the 
incorporation of transition risks into central banking tools, financial regulation and 
disclosures has the potential to have favourable effects on the decarbonisation 
process, the side effects of the incorporation of physical risks can be adverse. 
Consider, for example, a company that is located in a country or region that is 
particularly vulnerable to climate change and is therefore exposed to climate physical 
risks. This company needs to spend a potentially significant amount of money to 
undertake investment in climate adaptation. Therefore, it is crucial for it to have 
access to financial markets and bank loans at a low cost. If the bonds, stocks and 
loans of this company are penalised by central banks, financial regulators and 
private financial institutions, the attempts of this company to adapt to climate change 
will be undermined and its financial position is very likely to become worse. Actually, 
there is already evidence according to which the cost of debt is higher in climate 
vulnerable countries (see Beirne et al., 2021; Kling et al. 2021).). The tendency of 
the financial system to penalise such countries, that are in high need of climate 
adaptation investment, can be exacerbated if financial institutions and central banks 
start to more actively manage their exposure to physical risks.6   
 
Although I view the systemic risk approach as superior to the risk exposure one, 
there is a series of issues that would arise in the case that central banks decide to 
implement such an approach. A first issue is whether such an approach is in line with 
the mandates of central banks and the market neutrality approach that many of them 
adopt. As far as the mandate is concerned, from a systems-based perspective, any 
contribution that central banks make to the reduction of emissions is conducive to 
the reduction of physical risks and is, thus, in line with their financial stability 
mandate, especially if this mandate is interpreted over a long-run horizon. Hence, 
although the incorporation of environmental sustainability into the mandate of central 
banks might facilitate the implementation of the systemic risk approach (as it has 
happened with the BoE), this is not strictly necessary. A re-interpretation of the 
financial stability mandate might suffice.   
 
As far as the market neutrality issue is concerned, the systemic risk approach is 
clear on this. It contends that many central bank interventions are not actually 
market-neutral: as the second proposition of this approach suggests, central banks 
have in many cases in the past shaped financial markets. Additionally, the pursuit of 
market neutrality is not desirable, especially in the context of climate change. This is 
 
transition risks into financial assessment might not lead financial institutions to sufficiently 
decarbonise their portfolios.   
6 Note that the ECB has announced that it will develop indicators on the exposure of financial 




so because the support of the existing carbon-intensive market structure is 
conducive to higher physical risks and undermines system-wide stability.7     
 
A second issue is how the climate footprint of companies that issue bonds and take 
out loans can be defined such that monetary policy and financial regulation be 
adjusted accordingly. There are many challenges in defining greenness and dirtiness 
in a way that is not conducive to greenwashing. However, some progress has 
recently been made in this issue. For example, despite its limitations (see Gabor et 
al., 2019), the EU Taxonomy (see European Commission, 2020) can be a starting 
point for defining greenness. Dirty companies have in some studies been identified 
based on the NACE 4-digit sectors that they belong to as well as based on their 
emission intensity and decarbonisations targets (e.g. Battiston et al., 2017; Battiston 
and Monasterolo, 2019; Dafermos et al., 2020a, 2020b, 2021a; Schoenmaker, 
2021). The expectation is that the coming years will see an improvement in the 
availability of data related to greenness and dirtiness, as well as in methodologies 
that identify the climate footprint of activities and companies using both backward-
looking and forward-looking indicators. Importantly, the more quickly central banks 
and financial supervisors incorporate climate issues into their operations and 
decisions, the higher is expected to be the pace of the progress on this issue.   
 
A third issue is how central banks can coordinate in practice in order to support 
simultaneously decarbonisation. This sounds like a very challenging task given that it 
has not actually happened again in the past. However, NGFS has already created a 
platform that has the potential to be used for the promotion of such a coordination. If 
NGFS supports explicitly the systemic risk approach, it can become the key network 
for sharing good practices and providing guidelines on how central banks and 
financial supervisors can implement effectively climate-aligned financial and 
monetary policies.   
 
At the same time, such a coordination should take into account climate justice issues 
and the different responsibilities of the Global South and the Global North with 
regard to climate change. Given that the Global North carries the main responsibility 
for the cumulative greenhouse gas emissions that have caused global warming 
(Botzen et al., 2008; Hickel, 2020), it is crucial to recognise that the central banks in 
the Global North need to take more drastic action in the climate adjustment of their 
tools. It is also significant to consider that that the Global South is generally much 
more vulnerable to climate change (Edmonds et al., 2020; Perry, 2020). Central 
banks in the Global South might therefore need to make more efforts to support the 




7 For a critique of the market neutrality principle, see also Senni and Monnin (2020) and van’t Klooster 






Despite the recent consensus that central banks should consider climate change in 
their monetary analyses and decision-making processes, no consensus exists on 
how this should be done in practice and what the theoretical underpinnings of central 
bank interventions should be. Currently, most central banks in high-income countries 
seem to be adopting policies and practices that are closer to the risk exposure 
approach. This approach emphasises the need to assess and quantify the exposure 
of the financial system to climate risks and reflect these risks in central bank and 
financial supervision/regulation tools.  
 
On the contrary, the systemic risk approach emphasises that, due to the existence of 
fundamental uncertainty, it is impossible to measure climate risks accurately. 
Drawing on post-Keynesian and ecological economics, this approach views climate 
change from a system-wide perspective, emphasising the complex interactions 
between the macroeconomy, the financial system, the ecosystem, the political 
system and the society. It also highlights that central bank interventions and financial 
regulations affect the way that climate risks materialise. Hence, the adoption of the 
systemic risk approach would make central banks more active actors, since it would 
suggest that central banks need to intervene as soon as possible to help reduce 
climate-related instability. This approach also opens up the possibility for a policy 
coordination in the fight against climate change, both at the national and the global 
level.  
 
I have argued that in the era of climate emergency, central banks need to adopt as 
soon as possible the systemic risk approach. This would involve significant 
challenges, such as the need for an accurate definition of degrees of greenness and 
dirtiness. But the more central banks delay to become more pro-active in the area of 
the climate crisis, the more they lose the opportunity to contribute to the fight against 
climate change and the more they share the responsibility for the implications of 
climate inaction. Central bank intervention will not in any case be sufficient to 
address the climate problem: other policies and deeper structural social changes are 
necessary to take place at the same time. However, a change in the direction of the 
most powerful institutions in finance-dominated capitalism would be an important 
step in decarbonising our economies and safeguarding the resilience of the financial 
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